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STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 
 
         Roy Terry Bennett appeals from a sentence imposed by 
the district court.  He contends that the district court erred in 
sentencing him as an armed career criminal under 18 U.S.C. § 
924(e) and in assuming that the cocaine base involved in his 
offense was crack cocaine.  Bennett also claims that the district 
court improperly delegated to the probation officer matters 
concerning payment of the fine imposed as part of his sentence.  
We conclude that the record is sufficient to confirm Bennett's 
eligibility for sentencing as an armed career criminal but we 
remand to the district court for further proceedings to determine 
whether the cocaine base involved here was crack and to establish 
the fine repayment schedule. 
                                I. 
         Bennett pled guilty to three federal firearms charges 
and one federal drug charge in September 1995.  The three 
firearms violations were for making false statements in 
connection with acquisition of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6), 
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. § 
922(g)(1), and possession of a firearm with an obliterated serial 
number, 18 U.S.C. § 922(k).  Bennett also pled guilty to 
distributing cocaine, a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). 
         The government moved to have Bennett sentenced for his 
§ 922(g) firearms violation under the Armed Career Criminal Act.  
18 U.S.C. § 924(e) [hereinafter "ACCA" or "§ 924(e)"].  Under the 
ACCA, a person who violates § 922(g) and has been previously 
convicted of three "violent felonies" or "serious drug offenses" 
must be sentenced to a mandatory minimum of fifteen years 
imprisonment and fined up to $25,000.  Id.  Prior to his present 
federal convictions, Bennett had been convicted three times of 
burglary in Pennsylvania. 
         In determining Bennett's sentence for the distribution 
of cocaine conviction, the court adopted the Presentence Report's 
application of the sentencing guideline for distribution of crack 
cocaine.  U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1.  Applying the relevant guidelines for 
grouping offenses and for determining the offense level when 
there are multiple counts, and factoring in Bennett's acceptance 
of responsibility for his criminal acts, the court found that the 
applicable guideline range in the absence of the ACCA would have 
been 135 to 168 months.  Because this was less than the mandatory 
minimum required by the ACCA, and because it determined that the 
ACCA was applicable, the district court concluded that the 
effective guideline range was 180 months.  As a result of 
Bennett's cooperation with the government in other criminal 
investigations, the government requested a moderate downward 
departure from the applicable guideline range.  The court granted 
this request and sentenced Bennett to 130 months imprisonment, 
followed by sixty months of supervised release, and imposed a 
fine of $2,500. 
         Bennett presents four issues for review.  We will 
address each of them in turn. 
 
                               II. 
         Bennett's first argument on appeal is that the district 
court erred in treating his three Pennsylvania burglary 
convictions as predicate offenses within the scope of § 924(e).  
Specifically, Bennett contends that Pennsylvania's burglary 
statute is broader than the generic definition of burglary 
Congress incorporated into § 924(e).  If Pennsylvania's burglary 
statute is broader than generic burglary, the government had the 
burden of proving that, for each of Bennett's three burglary 
convictions, the trier of fact necessarily found all of the 
elements of generic burglary.  See United States v. Taylor, 495 
U.S. 575, 602 (1990).  Bennett contends that the government 
failed to meet this burden. 
         The government responds that Pennsylvania's burglary 
statute is generic, as a previous panel of this court has stated.  
See United States v. Watkins, 54 F.3d 163, 168 n.2 (3d Cir. 
1995).  Therefore, the government continues, the government 
satisfied its burden of proving Bennett's eligibility for ACCA 
sentence enhancement merely by showing that Bennett had been 
convicted of Pennsylvania burglary on three prior occasions.  
Alternatively, the government argues that the record is 
sufficient to show that the trier of fact necessarily found all 
of the elements of generic burglary in convicting Bennett for 
each of his three burglary offenses. 
         The question of whether Pennsylvania's burglary statute 
is "generic" arises because we must only apply the ACCA's 
mandatory minimum sentence to individuals whom Congress 
considered to be armed career criminals.  Congress, naturally, 
identified armed career criminals by their prior conduct.  
Section 924(e) states that the mandatory minimum must be applied 
to individuals who violate § 922(g) and who also have three 
previous convictions "for a violent felony or a serious drug 
offense, or both, committed on occasions different from one 
another."  18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1).  Because different 
jurisdictions have different views as to what constitutes a 
"violent felony" or a "serious drug offense," Congress had to 
define these terms for purposes of § 924(e).  As relevant here, 
Congress provided that, 
                        the term "violent felony" means any 
                    crime punishable by imprisonment for a term 
                    exceeding one year . . . that-- 
                                  (i) has as an element the use, 
                    attempted use, or threatened use of physical 
                    force against the person of another; or 
                                  (ii) is burglary, arson, or 
                    extortion, involves use of explosives, or 
                    otherwise involves conduct that presents a 
                    serious potential risk of physical injury to 
                    another . . . . 
           
18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B). 
 
         In Taylor, the Supreme Court construed § 924(e) and 
concluded that, within the context of the ACCA, "burglary" means 
generic burglary.  495 U.S. at 598-99.  Looking to the Model 
Penal Code and the definition of burglary in use in many states, 
the Court concluded that  
                    a person has been convicted of burglary for 
                    purposes of a § 924(e) enhancement if he is 
                    convicted of any crime, regardless of its 
                    exact definition or label, having the basic 
                    elements of unlawful or unprivileged entry 
                    into, or remaining in, a building or 
                    structure, with intent to commit a crime. 
           
Id. at 599. 
         Where a state defines burglary in a manner that 
"substantially corresponds" to Congress's generic definition of 
burglary, any conviction under that state's burglary statute can 
be used as a predicate offense for § 924(e) sentence enhancement.  
Id. at 602.  Moreover, where a state defines burglary more 
narrowly than this generic view -- for example, if the unlawful 
entry must be at night, or if the intent must be an intent to 
commit not just any crime but to commit a felony -- then any 
conviction may still be used as a predicate offense, since the 
defendant's conviction necessarily implies that the defendant was 
found guilty of all the elements of generic burglary.  See id. at 
599. 
         However, some states define burglary more broadly than 
Congress's generic definition -- for example, "by eliminating the 
requirement that the entry be unlawful, or by including places, 
such as automobiles and vending machines, other than buildings."  
Id.; see also id. (noting that Missouri burglary statute 
including breaking and entering of booth, tent, boat, vessel, or 
railroad car was broader than generic burglary).  A conviction 
under one of these broader burglary statutes cannot automatically 
serve as a predicate offense for purposes of § 924(e) because the 
conduct leading to the conviction, while constituting burglary 
under the state's broad definition of burglary, may not have 
constituted burglary as Congress understood the term.  Therefore, 
when a prior burglary conviction has occurred under a definition 
of burglary broader than Congress's generic definition of 
burglary, that conviction may only serve as a predicate offense 
for § 924(e) sentence enhancement if the court concludes that the 
trier of fact actually found all of the elements of generic 
burglary in convicting the defendant.  See id. at 602. 
         All three of Bennett's prior convictions arose under 
Pennsylvania's single burglary statute.  18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. 
§ 3502(a) [hereinafter "§ 3502"] defines the offense of burglary 
as follows:  
                    A person is guilty of burglary if he enters a 
                    building or occupied structure, or separately 
                    secured or occupied portion thereof, with 
                    intent to commit a crime therein, unless the 
                    premises are at the time open to the public 
                    or the actor is licensed or privileged to 
                    enter. 
           
"Occupied structure" is separately defined as: 
  
                    Any structure, vehicle or place adapted for 
                    overnight accommodation of persons, or for 
                    carrying on business therein, whether or not 
                    a person is actually present. 
           
18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3501. 
   
         We find that Pennsylvania's broad definition of 
"occupied structure" makes Pennsylvania's burglary statute 
broader than Congress's generic view of burglary.  Pennsylvania's 
statute is broader than generic burglary in two ways.  First, 
Pennsylvania includes within its definition of occupied structure 
any vehicle adapted for overnight accommodations or for business.  
18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3501.  In Pennsylvania, therefore, one 
may be guilty of burglary for unlawfully entering an automobile 
or other vehicle.  As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently 
stated, "The inclusion of 'any vehicle' in the statute 
demonstrates that the legislature did not intend to limit this 
statute to buildings."  Commonwealth v. Hagan, 654 A.2d 541, 545 
(Pa. 1995).  According to the U.S. Supreme Court in Taylor, 
however, a state burglary statute "including places, such as 
automobiles and vending machines, other than buildings," is a 
statute that defines burglary more broadly than Congress's 
generic definition.  495 U.S. at 599; see also United States v. 
Barney, 955 F.2d 635, 639 (10th Cir. 1992); United States v. 
Payton, 918 F.2d 54, 55 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v. Lane, 
909 F.2d 895, 902 (6th Cir. 1990). 
         Second, Pennsylvania includes as burglary unlawful 
entry of any place adapted for "carrying on business."  18 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3501.  "By defining 'occupied structure' to 
include 'places adapted for carrying on business,' the 
legislature extended to businesses, which are not always confined 
to structures made up of walls and a roof, the same protection 
from intrusion it afforded to dwellings, which traditionally are 
within buildings."  Commonwealth v. Evans, 574 A.2d 1051, 1054 
(Pa. Super. 1990); see also Hagan, 654 A.2d at 541 (affirming 
conviction for Pennsylvania burglary for unlawful entry of 
fenced-off outdoor storage area).  Given Pennsylvania's broad 
definition, it would be possible for a person to be convicted of 
burglary for unlawful entry into a yard where commercial activity 
occurs.  That person would not be guilty of "burglary" within the 
meaning of § 924(e), however. 
         In arguing that Pennsylvania's burglary statute is 
consistent with generic burglary, the government relies on this 
court's opinion in Watkins.  54 F.3d at 163.  It is true that in 
Watkins, in a footnote, we stated that the same burglary statute 
involved here "defines burglary in a manner consistent with, 
though somewhat more narrowly than, the generic 'burglary' that 
Congress intended in § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii)."  Id. at 168 n.2.  We 
are not bound by this statement because, as both parties here 
agree, it was dicta.  The single issue before the court in 
Watkins was whether to establish, as a prerequisite for imposing 
§ 924(e) sentence enhancement, that the court be presented with 
certified copies of the judgment of conviction for each of the 
defendant's prior convictions.  See id. at 166.  We held that 
certified copies of judgments are not necessary and that the 
evidence before the sentencing court was adequate to confirm the 
defendant's eligibility for sentencing under § 924(e).  See id.at 168.  In 
reaching our conclusion in Watkins, we noted that the 
defendant did not contend either that Pennsylvania's burglary 
statute was broader than generic burglary or that the trier of 
fact had failed to find all of the elements of generic burglary 
for his prior convictions.  See id.  Neither party had briefed or 
argued the issue of whether Pennsylvania's burglary statute is 
generic.  A court's statement concerning an issue not raised on 
appeal is dicta.  See Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 
772, 778 n.4 (3d Cir. 1994).  Therefore, our footnote in Watkinsis not 
binding precedent. 
         Since we have concluded that Pennsylvania's burglary 
statute is broader than § 924(e)'s generic definition of 
burglary, Bennett's enhanced sentence may only be affirmed if all 
of the elements of generic burglary were necessarily found for 
each of his three burglary convictions.  See Taylor, 495 U.S. at 
602.  In this situation, we may look, for each prior conviction, 
to the indictment or information and jury instructions, see id., 
and the certified record of conviction, see U.S. v. Preston, 910 
F.2d 81, 85 (3d Cir. 1990). 
         Here the government did not introduce the charging 
instruments, jury instructions, or certified records of 
conviction for any of Bennett's burglary convictions.  However, 
Bennett's district court counsel volunteered sufficient 
information concerning the conduct leading to Bennett's burglary 
convictions to satisfy us that the trier of fact necessarily 
found all of the elements of generic burglary for each of those 
prior convictions.  Details of those convictions were provided by 
defense counsel in a letter to Bennett's probation officer, seeApp. at 
24a, a letter to the sentencing judge, see id. at 25a- 
26a, and during the sentencing hearing, see id. at 34a, 56a.  
Defense counsel explained that Bennett's 1982 conviction involved 
removing a window from a Fotomat booth and stealing film, the 
1983 conviction involved burglary of a variety store, and the 
1990 conviction involved throwing a brick through a bakery 
window.  See id. at 26a, 34a, 56a. 
         Though Bennett asserts it is the government's burden to 
convince the court that his prior convictions were predicate 
offenses for purposes of § 924(e), nothing in Taylor or in any of 
our own circuit precedents prevents a court from relying on 
information having its source in the defense rather than in the 
prosecution.  We find that, on the record before us, including 
especially the admissions of Bennett's district court counsel, 
Bennett's convictions necessarily included all of the elements of 
generic burglary.  Therefore, we affirm the district court's 
conclusion that Bennett is eligible for sentence enhancement as 
an armed career criminal under § 924(e). 
 
                               III. 
         Bennett's brief argues that his 1990 conviction could 
not be used to qualify him for sentence enhancement under § 
924(e) because Bennett failed to appear for sentencing on that 
conviction.  However, as Bennett conceded just prior to oral 
argument, our recent decision in Jefferson, 88 F.3d at 240, 
settles this issue against him.  In Jefferson, we concluded that 
"the choice-of-law clause of section 921(a)(20) requires that the 
law of the jurisdiction in which the prior proceeding was held 
determine whether an offense constitutes a 'previous 
conviction.'"  Id. at 242.  Since the defendant in Jefferson had 
been adjudicated but not sentenced for a Pennsylvania offense, we 
then had to determine whether Pennsylvania requires sentencing in 
order to count a prior "conviction" for purposes of sentence 
enhancement.  We found:  
                    The law of Pennsylvania on this issue, then, 
                    appears settled: an adjudication of guilt, 
                    even though unaccompanied by sentencing, is a 
                    conviction for the purpose of enhanced 
                    sentencing so long as the adjudication was 
                    made before the commission of the current 
                    offense. 
           
Id. at 243. 
         Though Bennett has asked us to reconsider Jefferson, we 
are bound by our prior decision.  The adjudication of Bennett's 
final Pennsylvania burglary conviction occurred on October 10, 
1990.  The commission of the federal firearms offenses occurred 
between September 8, 1992 and January 6, 1994.  Therefore, 
Bennett's 1990 burglary conviction is a prior "conviction" for 
purposes of § 924(e) sentence enhancement. 
 
                               IV. 
         The government concedes that remand is required on the 
final two issues pressed by Bennett. 
         In sentencing Bennett for his drug offense, the 
district court applied the sentencing guideline for "cocaine 
base," U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, and the mandatory minimum sentence of 
five years imprisonment in the statute penalizing distribution of 
"cocaine base," 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(iii).  Bennett argues 
that application of this sentencing guideline and this statutory 
provision was error because § 2D1.1 defines "cocaine base" as 
"crack," and the government failed to prove that the cocaine base 
involved here was crack.  The government does not oppose remand 
for a further sentencing hearing at which both sides will be 
permitted to present evidence on whether the cocaine base 
involved in Bennett's offense was crack cocaine.  We will remand 
for the district court to conduct such proceedings. 
         Finally, both parties agree that the district court 
erred by delegating to the probation officer the task of 
establishing the installment schedule by which Bennett will pay 
the fine imposed as part of his sentence.  We held that such a 
delegation is improper in United States v. Graham, 72 F.3d 352, 
356-57 (3d Cir. 1995), a case decided after Bennett was 
sentenced.  As Graham directs, and as the parties agree, 
Bennett's case must be remanded for the district court to set the 
fine repayment schedule. 
 
                                V. 
         Thus, while we agree with the district court that        
§ 924(e) is applicable here, we will reverse the judgment of 
sentence and remand this case to the district court for 
resentencing proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
________________________________________ 
